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DISCLOSURE OF THE AIR FORCE HUMAN FACTORS
INVESTIGATION
GENE R. BEATY*
Traditionally the findings of military aircraft accident investiga-
tions have been shrouded in secrecy. As a result, it has been diffi-
cult for civilian attorneys to advise potential plaintiffs about the
prospects for successful products liability litigation. New rules,
requiring disclosure of information by the Government, have
threatened to disrupt longstanding confidential relationships be-
tween manufacturers and their military customers and to alter our
concept of individual personal privacy. As the frequency of liability
suits for defective products increases, it is probable that this long-
standing conflict will continue.
Whether civilian or military, an air crash exacts a high cost-
the deaths of highly trained and experienced personnel and the loss
of expensive equipment. To reduce these losses, the military and
civilian accident investigating teams have become increasingly
proficient in discovering the cause of aircraft crashes so that efforts
can be made to avoid future accidents. Traditionally, manpower
and other resources have concentrated on discovering the structural
and mechanical causes of a crash, but little attention was paid to
the human factors contributing to the accident until the late 1950's.1
Recently, however, the flight surgeon has assumed an increasingly
important role in accident investigation and prevention.
The function of the flight surgeon is to care for the health of
* Captain Beaty is Forensic Medicine Advisor to the Aerospace Medical Divi-
sion, AFSC, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. Views expressed in this article must
be considered the views of the individual author. They do not purport to promul-
gate nor voice the views of The Judge Advocate General, USAF, the Department
of the Air Force, nor any other Department or Agency of the Government of
the United States.
Armstrong, Fryer, Stewart and Whittingham, Interpretation of Injuries in
the Comet Aircraft Disasters, LANCET 1143 (1955).
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the crew members! and to be familiar with their personal and safety
equipment so that he can render professional advice in the handling,
use, and improvement of this equipment.' There is no question that
a defect in the design or manufacture of equipment such as pressure
suits, oxygen masks and helmets, anti-G-suits, parachute equipment
and survival equipment can be fatal. The flight surgeon is expected
to understand the significance of the various elements of the cock-
pit instruments and controls; the shape and dimensions of the work
area and emergency escape areas; aircraft ejection seats and the
restraint system; the obstructions and distractions of the visual field;
breathing and pressurization systems; and inflight procedures. The
doctor's awareness of all these factors is very important to both the
clinical and the accident investigation phases of the safety program.
AcCIDENT INVESTIGATION
The human factors phase of aircraft accident investigation con-
sists of an examination of the psychological, physiological, and
environmental variables which determine human performance in
aviation." In recent years increasingly sophisticated investigation
techniques such as aviation pathology and human factors engineer-
ing have been utilized to analyze the actions of the crew members,
tower controllers, or others who may have contributed to the crash.
The flight surgeon is responsible for performing a thorough medical
examination of all surviving crew members or passengers; conduct-
ing a comprehensive investigation into the physiological and
psychological conditions of the crew prior to and during the flight;
and investigating all factors relating to the escape, survival and
personal equipment of the crew.' The source and sequence of in-
juries may be determined in these ways and by an autopsy of the
fatalities.! This investigation is summarized in an oral and written
report to the appropriate investigation board.
The Air Force convenes two separate investigations when an




'These requirements are detailed in AFM 127-1, ch. 14; AFP 161-18, ch. 14;
AFM 160-109.
Id.
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accident occurs which is likely to result in litigation. The Aircraft
Accident Safety Investigation is designed to determine all the
circumstances in order to avoid recurrence. It is the primary in-
vestigation and takes priority over the collateral investigation in
interviewing witnesses, obtaining and analyzing evidence, or in-
specting the scene of the accident.7 An important feature of the
safety investigation is that much of the report may be withheld from
disclosure to the public. Each witness may be told that his testimony
or other evidence will be confidential and will not be used for any
other purpose except accident prevention. The Air Force considers
this confidential relationship to be essential to ensure frank and
open communications between the witnesses and the investigators.
This investigation is the only one likely to have a flight surgeon
assigned.8
The Collateral Investigation, on the other hand, is convened to
obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litiga-
tion, adverse administrative or disciplinary proceedings or any other
purpose." Two separate investigations are justified since the col-
lateral investigation will contain the evidence which should be
released to litigants, but the report of the safety investigation will
contain some information that should not be disclosed to the
public." Also, the collateral investigation is less concerned with
making recommendations to improve safety or performance of the
aircraft. Since the safety investigation report is more complete,
there has been a long history of litigation involving efforts to secure
access to it.
THE PRIVILEGED STATUS OF SAFETY REPORTS
The Air Force has always maintained that effective aircraft
accident investigation requires free access to all relevant informa-
tion by safety investigators. It is believed that if the safety report
of the investigation is freely releasable to Air Force personnel, their
7 AFR 124-4 (1973); Watts & Johnson, Discovery Problems in Aircraft Litiga-
tion, 44 OKLA. B. Ass'N J. 533 (Quarterly Supp. 1973).
'Assignment of an experienced aerospace medical officer (flight surgeon or
flight medical officer) is required by AFR 127-4, 5 11(d)lc.
9AFR 110-14, 1 (Nov. 1, 1973).
"Burton, Aircraft Investigations: An Analysis of the Recent Changes in the
New Regulations Governing the Investigations, 14 JAG L. REV. 233 (1973).
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dependents, or other potential plaintiffs, the potential defendants
(such as the designer, manufacturer or contract maintenance
facility) might refuse to cooperate in an investigation which might
disclose their negligence. Representatives of these businesses and
all other witnesses are told that information submitted to the safety
board will be used only for accident prevention purposes. This
promise encourages witnesses and board members to speculate
about the causes of the crash and recommend changes which will
prevent future accidents.
In 1953 the Supreme Court upheld the privileged status of safety
reports because the executive branch of the federal government
has the authority to withhold information from the public when
national security interests are threatened." The Court held that the
lower federal court did not have authority to insist upon an exami-
nation of the accident report, even in the privacy of its chambers,
since the plane was carrying secret equipment. It was apparent that
the report of the investigation "would contain references to the se-
cret electronic equipment which was the primary concern of the
mission."' Although the Supreme Court held that the complete
report was privileged, it is unlikely that the same result would occur
today because of the impact of the Freedom of Information Act
and the present Federal Rules of Evidence."
Subsequent cases foretold the inevitability of the present rules.
In 1963 the Air Force was ordered to release the factual findings
of Air Force mechanics who had examined the wreckage."' The
Air Force had argued that disclosure of the factual portion of
witnesses' statements would hamper its ability to secure the co-
operation and frank testimony. The court conceded that this might
be true of nongovernmental witnesses such as technical representa-
tives of various companies that might be at fault, but rejected the
argument as it applied to factual determinations by governmental
witnesses.
The court distinguished between factual information and de-
liberations or recommendations about Air Force policies to be
"United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
12 345 U.S. at 10.
"See text discussion beginning at note 24 infra.
"4Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
896 (1963).
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pursued."5 This distinction was clarified in a supplemental opinion
which held that the mechanics' "opinions" and "conclusions" about
possible defects in the propellors were not automatically protected
from disclosure because these could be essentially "factual" de-
terminations rather than policy analyses. Nevertheless, the court
recognized that this distinction was very subtle and held that the
report should be submitted to the trial court for decision. This case
introduced a very important distinction, but the court failed to
explain it fully.
A later case clarified the distinction somewhat by recognizing
"expert opinion" as essentially a factual determination." The court
ordered that all factual information be released including the
"conclusion of any witness or person who is asked an opinion
predicated on facts of the investigation provided such person,
including a board member, is qualified as an expert with reference
to the particular conclusions requested."" The court did not expand
on this order, but the decision explains why the mechanics'
"opinions" were included as factual information by the earlier court.
By the same logic, the medical determinations of the flight surgeon
may be considered "expert opinion" in most cases, but, as the courts
have recognized, the expert opinion must still be essentially factual
in order to be releasable. It is not clear how much confidentiality
an "expert" can expect when analyzing or speculating about the
cause of an accident, but the court would probably attempt to dis-
cern the degree of certainty that the expert had in the judgment.
In 1965 another court held that the privileged status of a report
can be waived by the Government.1 In a series of accident in-
vestigations, technical representatives of the aircraft manufacturer
worked closely with the manufacturer to prepare several "group
reports" on the technical factors in the accident. These final safety
reports had been released to the authors (including the industry
representatives) in order to improve air safety. Later the manu-
facturer was sued, and plaintiffs argued that it was unfair for only
the manufacturer to have access to these reports-even though the
5 Id. at 339-40.
18 McFadden v. Avco Corp., 278 F. Supp. 57 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
"Id. at 60.
"O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
manufacturer denied using the reports for litigation purposes. The
court agreed that fairness required release of the factual portions of
the reports since it was impracticable to police the manufacturer's
use of the reports. The court went on to suggest that even the
privilege accorded opinions, conclusions, and recommendations
could be waived, but held that this privilege was much weightier
than the one for factual information." A special master was ap-
pointed to distinguish between factual and other information.
As a result of this case Air Force procedures were changed to
prevent industry representatives from being board members or from
furnishing any part of the report not otherwise available to the
public."° Nevertheless, the Air Force recognizes a close affinity of
interests with the manufacturers that support the Air Force mission.
Because the manufacturers must implement any safety proposals
arising from the investigation, the results of the investigation
obviously must be shared with them. Also, any judgments against
the manufacturer or increased insurance costs will be reflected in
the cost of future weapon systems, leaving the Air Force little
incentive to aid plaintiffs in products liability litigation. Manu-
facturers are in a uniquely awkward situation in military crash
investigations because they sometimes are forced to defend against
allegations that a product was defective while maintaining a con-
tinuing business relationship with the best, and often, only customer:
the Department of Defense." The usual case arises when the heirs
of military personnel, who cannot sue the United States," bring suit
against the manufacturer or component manufacturer on a products
liability theory, placing the manufacturer in the position of defend-
ing against suit by an employee while maintaining a healthy bus-
iness relationship with the employer. It has been suggested that the
privilege for safety board reports reflects the sensitivity of courts to
this awkward position of manufacturers."
19 Id.
10 USAF Deputy Inspector for Inspection and Safety, Policy Letter No. 18
(Dec. 8, 1965).
2" Finn & Martin, Discovery in a Military Aircraft Crash-Defendant's View-
point, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 295, 296 (1975).
'Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine
After Twenty-Five Years, 18 AIR FORCE L. REV. 24 (1976).
2 Finn and Martin, supra note 21, at 305 n.24; Sales, Discovery Problems in
Aviation Litigation, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 297 (1972).
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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT EXEMPTIONS
Congress has recognized that the Government needs to maintain
certain confidential relationships with industry and to protect cer-
tain internal documents from disclosure. The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act" established a policy of open disclosure but provided
nine specific exemptions. Four of these are relevant to the discussion
of the human factors portion of accident investigation. These are:
(1) information properly classified as secret in the interest of
national security; (2) confidential data such as trade secrets which
have been obtained from a person upon assurance that it would
be held in confidence; (3) inter-agency or intra-agency policy
memoranda; and (4) medical and similar files that must be main-
tained in confidence to avoid a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.' Information within the first category includes
only information which has been classified as SECRET or TOP
SECRET in accordance with proper procedures.' Information in
the other categories is considered by the military to be "For
Official Use Only."" Merely classifying information into one of
these exempt categories does not resolve the inquiry, however, since
there must also be a governmental determination that a significant
and legitimate purpose would be served by non-disclosure."' Also,
whether classified or not, it is necessary to examine the requested
document to determine whether portions of it can be segregated and
released." The burden is on the Government to justify with-
holdings,' and the exemptions are strictly and narrowly construed."
The second category, information obtained from a person or
company outside the Government upon an understanding that the
information would be treated as confidential,"' includes trade secrets
24 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975), as implemented by
AFR 12-30 (Feb. 19, 1975).
2s5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(1)-(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975).
21"d. at § 552(b)(1).
27AFR 12-31, 5 1 (July 15, 1974).
28 AFR 12-30, 5 10 (Feb. 19, 1975).
29 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1973); Legal Aid Soc'y of
Alameda County v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
"0 Benson v. General Services Admin., 289 F. Supp. 590, 593 (W.D. Wash.
1968).
"Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
32 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975).
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and other commercial or financial information that, if released,
might impair the company's competitive position. This exemption
protects, for example, life support equipment designers or manu-
facturers who aid the safety investigation board. The House Report
which accompanied the Act states: "a citizen must be able to con-
fide in his Government. Moreover, where the Government has
obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents of informa-
tion it receives, it should be able to honor such obligations."'
In Brockaway v. Dept. of Air Force,3' this exemption was relied
on to deny release of a manufacturer's confidential report contain-
ing findings and opinions about the possible causes of the crash. The
district court recognized that this exemption applied only to trade
secrets and information which is (a) commercial or financial, (b)
obtained from a person outside government, and (c) privileged or
confidential.' The plaintiff argued that the requested information
was not commercial or financial data since it concerned technical
engineering data and judgments. The court recognized that a
manufacturer is less likely to be candid about possible manu-
facturing defects in a report that will be revealed to the public.
Publication of such a report would not only endanger its competi-
tive stance in the industry, but also might increase the company's
risk of liability claims. Thus, the court decision reaffirmed that the
safety investigator may properly request advice, opinions and rec-
ommendations from manufacturers or designers with a promise of
confidentiality." Finally, it should be noted that this exemption does
not protect the statements or other evidence submitted by personnel
within the Government.
The third category permits Government personnel to offer rec-
ommendations without fear of disclosure.' As one federal court
stated, this exemption was intended to encourage the free exchange
of ideas during the process of deliberation and policy making:
[I]t has been held to protect internal communications consisting
of advice, recommendations, opinions, and other material reflecting
deliberation or policy-making processes, but not purely factual or
3"2 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 2427 (1966).
34 Brockway v. Department of Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
5Id. at 740.
3" Id. at 740-41; Finn & Martin, supra note 21, at 307-08.
375 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975).
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investigatory reports. Factual information may be protected only
if it is inextricably intertwined with policy-making processes....
But courts must beware of the inevitable temptation of a govern-
ment litigant to give [this exemption] an expansive interpreta-
tion. ...
The federal discovery rules are used as a guide to interpreting these
exemptions.39 Rule 26 states that a party may obtain a discovery of
documents prepared by the other party "only upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials
... and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."' This pro-
vision only affects factual information since the mental impressions,
opinions, conclusions, or legal theories of a party are protected
from disclosure whether prepared by an attorney or other con-
sultants." In determining whether "undue hardship" and "sub-
stantial need" exist, the court considers such factors as the need to
protect the mental impressions of a party, the lapse of time since
the accident, the availability and location of witnesses, whether the
witnesses are employees or agents of an adverse party, the avail-
ability of evidence after the accident, and whether there were any
survivors.' In Brockway the court decided that an offer to disclose
the names of the witnesses and to allow the witnesses to refresh
their memories from their previous statements was not the "sub-
stantial equivalent" of providing the original testimony since mem-
ories fade over time. ' Also, Air Force witnesses are likely to be
scattered around the country, or even the world, by the time
litigation occurs and may be reluctant to testify against their em-
ployer or a manufacturer having a close relationship with the
Air Force." Therefore, if the factual testimony of an Air Force
witness is not preserved by the collateral board investigation, it
may be secured from the safety investigation report if the court is
persuaded that both "undue hardship" and "substantial need" for
31 Soucie, supra note 31, at 1077-78.
31 Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp.
796, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"'Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(3).
41 Id.
"Brockway, supra note 34, at 741.
4Id.
4Id.
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the information exist.' It is therefore important for the collateral
board to interview and preserve the factual testimony and evidence
of all witnesses. The mental impressions, opinions and recom-
mendations for safety purposes may be confined to the safety
board, however, without fear of disclosure.
The fourth category, "medical and similar files" is obviously
important to the human factors investigator, but it is also one of
the most difficult exemptions to interpret since it applies only to
information that would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy" if disclosed.' This requires a balancing of
interests between the protection of an individual's private affairs
from unnecessary public scrutiny and the preservation of the
public's right to governmental information."' It appears that the
words "clearly unwarranted" and the general policy set forth by
the Act tilt the balance toward disclosure.' In determining the
proper balance a court might consider "undue: hardship" and
"substantial need" discussed in the preceding paragraph, but the
weight accorded personal privacy is difficult to calculate. Generally,
the personal records of deceased persons are not protected,' but
intimate personal details about decedents which involve surviving
associates such as the wife are likely to require a very persuasive
showing of "substantial need." In a recent case the court reviewed
the medical records requested by a plaintiff and ordered the Air
Force to release them since "their disclosure will not threaten the
privacy of any individual."' It is likely that future decisions will
also require a careful case by case analysis. Of course, an individual
or his heirs may have access to his own medical information or
information gathered about him."
As a result of these cases and statutory clarification of the law,
Id. at 742.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975).
"Department of Air Force v. Rose, 96 S. Ct. 1592, 1604 (1976); Getman v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1971); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1965).
"' Johnson, The Freedom of Information Act: Its Application in the Air Force,
16 AIR FORCE L. REV. 54, 61 (1974).
" OMB Circular No. A-108, 40 Fed. Reg. 28948, 28951 (1975).
"Rabbit v. Department of Air Force, 401 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
1 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f) (3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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it appears that factual determinations must be released to litigants
in appropriate circumstances, but that confidential opinions, rec-
ommendations and personal medical information may be withheld.
The current Air Force safety regulation recognizes this distinction
by stating that, despite the restrictions placed on use of some parts
of the safety report, factual material (such as wreckage diagrams,
maps, transcripts of air traffic communications and so forth) will
be released as required by the collateral board, or as otherwise
required by law." A more detailed examination of the safety in-
vestigation will provide a clearer idea of the type of human factors
information that might be released to the collateral board and
other interested persons in appropriate cases.
THE HUMAN FACTORS INVESTIGATION
Although it will sometimes be necessary for the human factors
investigator to perform an autopsy, this responsibility is accom-
plished by a forensic pathologist whenever possible. It is preferable
to select a forensic pathologist with an aviation background since
extreme G forces produce effects different from ordinary traffic
fatalities. Further, a knowledge of the aircraft environment in
which the fatality occurred better prepares the doctor to produce
meaningful recommendations which may reduce future accidents.
Unfortunately, since a doctor with this special training is hard to
find, it is usually necessary for the flight surgeon to work closely
with a local pathologist. Whereas the pathologist with an aviation
background will only need a short briefing to acquaint him with
the medical history and the circumstances of the flight, the patho-
logist who is unacquainted with aircraft crashes will need the active
participation of the flight surgeon to point out special areas of
interest associated with the aviation accident. As a minimum, the
flight surgeon must take the following steps:
(1) Attempt to identify all fatalities by fingerprinting the victims
and footprinting all military aviators." If the remains cannot be
identified by these means, he must prepare dental charts or use
52AFR 127-4, 5 27(a)(3) (October 24, 1975) (the Office of the Judge Ad-
vocate General exercises the discretion to release information in appropriate cir-
cumstances).
I'Simson, 4 THE FoRENsIc SCIENCE GAZETTE 1, 3 (Apr. 1973).
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other means such as the identification of clothing, documents,
jewelry, radiological or seriological examinations."4 The extreme
measures that are sometimes required to identify fatalities have
been justified on many grounds; from the purely sociological to a
right of every freeborn man to an identity beyond death.' For-
tunately, most military accidents involve only one or two fatalities
and do not create the immense problems of identification associated
with the crash of a common carrier. Whenever two or more
fatalities occur, however, the seating pattern should be determined
prior to the removal of the bodies from the scene. This information
can be of assistance to the pathologist in identifying the bodies
and may be crucial in determining the operator of the craft.
Identifying the operator is often difficult but may be a very im-
portant legal concern, particularly in cases of dual control aircraft.
(2) Photographs of both the crash site and of the autopsy must
be secured. Upon his arrival at the scene, the flight surgeon should
have cameras capable of both black and white as well as color
photographs since adverse weather conditions frequently are as-
sociated with accidents. It is important that the doctor reach the
scene before any human remains are moved so that he can photo-
graph: (a) the body or bodies in relationship to the aircraft; (b)
the relationship between the body positions and the restraint system
of the aircraft; and (c) the distance of the bodies from other parts
of the wreckage."
It is important to use discretion and care in the photography
and, most important of all, to take many photographs." It is
impossible to take too many photographs in a complex human
factors investigation. Generally, it is good technique to begin with
overall scene photographs which reveal the relationship of the hu-
man factors material to the other portions of the wreckage. There-
after, closer shots should be taken in order to relate details of the in-
vestigation to the overall scene. Finally, detailed shots of the bodies
or portions of the wreckage should be taken to disclose important
"4Tarlton, Identification in Aircraft Accidents, in AEROSPACE PATHOLOGY
53-63 (Mason and Reals ed. 1973).
I55 d. at 53.
5 REALS, MEDICAL INVESTIGATION OF AVIATION ACCIDENTS 91, 94-95 (1968).
" Besant-Mathews, Photography and Radiography in Aircraft Accident In-
vestigation, in AEROSPACE AUTOPSY (Mason and Reals ed. 1973).
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details. All bodies should be photographed from several angles
before they are moved. They should be photographed again after
removal to the morgue. Prior to autopsy any bodies should first be
photographed with clothing in place, with special concern for the
portions of the survival or restraint gear which may still be attached
to the body. 8 It is preferable to have a well-trained photographer
to take the pictures, but it is important that the doctor carefully
supervise the photography since the typical military photographer
is likely to be upset by the gruesome nature of an accident scene.
In addition, the doctor should inform the photographer about the
purpose of the photographs. Furthermore, the photographer and
the photographs need to be documented with care for later
identification.
During the autopsy photography should be supplemented with
the use of a dictating machine to record accurately the progress
of the autopsy. Radiography should be employed if fractures are
suspected or foreign material appears to be lodged in the body.
X-rays are a satisfactory means of recording fractures with a
minimum time expenditure by the doctor and may well be a more
accurate recording." Complete body x-rays are recommended since
numerous fractures usually accompany crash fatalities. Routine
x-ray for spinal fractures are of particular interest in aviation
pathology, since these injuries are frequently related to escapes by
ejection, helicopter, parachute, and rear-engined, high-tail transport
aircraft casualties."0
One problem unique to military aircraft accidents is securing
authority for autopsy of the fatalities. As a general rule, authoriza-
tion to perform an autopsy must be obtained from a decedent's
surviving spouse or next of kin or by state law."' There are legal
exceptions to this basic requirement which are frequently applicable
to aviation disasters. The National Transportation Safety Board is
empowered to conduct autopsies or other tests as required except
that provisions of local law protecting religious beliefs with respect
-18 REALS, supra note 56, at 95.
59 Besant-Mathews, supra note 57, at 185; See also Simson, Roetet Geogra-
phy in the Human Factors Investigation of Fatal Aviation Accidents, 43 AVIATION
MEDICINE 81. (1972).
60 Id.
1 18 AM. JuR. 2d Coroners or Medical Examiners § 14 (1965).
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to autopsies have to be observed "to the extent possible considering
the needs of the investigation. '" ' This authority applies in cases
of air crashes involving collisions between civilian and military
aircraft within NTSB jurisdiction. The statute, however, is not con-
sidered authority for the military to order autopsies when only
military aircraft are involved. Nevertheless, military regulations
provide that autopsies may be performed on air crew members
believed to have been involved in the actual operation of the air-
craft. Autopsies should also be performed on other personnel
aboard the aircraft if the examining medical officer believes it will
help explain the cause of the accident. In such cases the flight
surgeon should recommend to the hospital commander having
custody of the remains that a post-mortem examination be per-
formed on all persons who sustained fatal injuries." For instance,
this procedure might be necessary when a plane explodes in flight.
Local laws governing autopsy should be respected. In doubtful
cases the medical officer should seek consent for the autopsy from
the next of kin or seek the authority of an official coroner's request
under local law." Although it is necessary to perform the autopsies
authorized by the regulations, problems occasionally arise with
local officials who are jealous of their authority or concerned about
enforcing strict compliance with local law. Therefore, to avoid
problems it is important that the military doctor actively seek the
cooperation of the local officials and involve them in the human
factors investigation. When problems cannot be avoided by the use
of tact and consideration for the local official's pride in his re-
sponsibility, the local Staff Judge Advocate should be brought into
the investigation. Generally, however, it will be sufficient to show
the local official the regulation directing the senior medical officer
to conduct the autopsy and attempt to persuade him that matters
related to military aviation are peculiarly a federal concern, justify-
ing his full cooperation with the federal investigators. Unfortunately,
'249 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970).
63 AFR 160-109, 5 3 (Feb. 17, 1964). Nevertheless, clear authority only exists
to order an autopsy when the death occurs on an installation under exclusive
U.S. jurisdiction; otherwise the local law must be complied with. AFM 110-3,
5 5-4 (May 17, 1976).
4The Commander would exercise authority for the autopsy in accordance
with either local or federal law as appropriate.
-AFM 110-3, 5 16-4(c), (d) (Mar. 26, 1967).
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the military regulations are not interpreted to preempt state laws
in this area, and local coroners are not always sympathetic to the
military concern for a complete human factors investigation.
Conflicts are therefore inevitable.
During the investigation the collateral board president will prob-
ably request copies of the releasable photographs, x-rays, and other
factual information. Photographs of fatalities should not be in-
cluded in either the collateral or the safety investigation report."
These photographs are invariably gruesome and should be treated
with care. Generally, unless the photos are very important to the
investigation, they will only be released to the next-of-kin or their
representative. The accident scene, however, should be described in
writing in the report and the photographs (as always) preserved for
potential litigation purposes. Photographs of wreckage (even
though blood splattered) should be included in Part I of the safety
report which is available to the public. Photographs of staged
events, other recordings of speculation or analysis,"' and additional
life science information is retained in Part II of the safety report
and thus is not available to the public unless requested by the
collateral board or ordered to be produced by a court."'
THE COLLATERAL BOARD INVESTIGATION
The Air Force has increased its emphasis on the collateral board
investigation to reduce the legal pressures on the confidential status
of information contained in the safety board report.69 Recent cases
have demonstrated that the courts will release medical information
from the safety report in appropriate instances. In Rabbit v.
Department of the Air Force" the court released the entire Life
Sciences Report since the release did not invade the personal pri-
vacy of any individual." The court apparently concluded that this
report did not contain any protected findings, recommendations or
opinions because after a private examination of the records, the
-AFM 127-1, 5 14-4 (Mar. 16, 1972).
aAFM 127-2(C)(3), 5 3-3(a)(18) (Nov. 28, 1975).
"
8 Id. at 5 3-3(b)(6).
69 Burton, Aircraft Accident Investigations: An Analysis of the Recent Changes
in the New Regulations Governing the Investigations, 14 JAG L. REv. 233 (1973).
10401 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
71 1d. at 1210.
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court refused to relate these kinds of protected information." In a
later case the Air Force voluntarily released the bulk of the Life
Sciences Report, but refused to release the last page, which contain-
ed a summary of the investigator's opinions, speculations, conclu-
sions, and advice to the Safety Board."' The court upheld the Air
Force's limited claim of privilege for this portion of the report and
the statements of eight witnesses since, after a private examination,
the court decided that the withheld documents contained "specula-
tions, analysis, opinions, guesstimates, 'brainstorming', and exercises
in logic."' These releases from the safety report would have been
unnecessary if the collateral board report had contained all the
factual medical information.
In order to preserve the confidentiality of the human factors
portion of the report, increased emphasis must be placed on the
collateral investigation by human factors investigators. This will
not be an easy task because it is not customary to assign trained
medical personnel to collateral boards and because the human
factors area involves difficult problems of protecting personal
privacy rights. Adequate authority already exists for additional
emphasis, however, since the collateral board investigators may
examine the wreckage, review any records other than the actual
safety board proceedings, and request additional tests and inspec-
tions. Further, the collateral board may call any witness, including
expert witnesses and members of the safety board, but may not re-
quire any witness to reveal the proceedings, recommendations or
findings of the safety board. Additionally, if the safety board presi-
dent is aware of relevant government documents, he is directed to
make the original copy available to the collateral board." Several
rules, however, limit the effectiveness of the collateral board.
It is the responsibility of the collateral investigator to make sure
that each witness understands that the results of the collateral board
are intended for purposes other than accident prevention. Each
witness must also be advised of his constitutional rights regarding
his privilege to refuse to give testimony that is self-incriminating.
72 Id.
" Theriault v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 637, 639-40 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
4 Id. at 642.
75AFR 110-14, 1 (Nov. 1, 1975); AFM 127-1, 3 15-2d (Mar. 16, 1972).
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Obviously, such warnings inhibit frank testimony and (but for the
regulatory requirement)"6 they are only really necessary when the
board is considering disciplinary action against a service member,
or there is suspicion of an improper or unlawful act, or industry
representatives are asked to submit testimony which might form a
basis of criminal liability. Nevertheless, industry representatives
must be made aware that the collateral investigation is different
from the safety board investigation.
It would defeat the purpose of having the two proceedings if a
collateral investigator is permitted to observe the proceedings of the
safety board. Although the two investigations may be conducted
at the same time, the safety board takes priority in interviewing
witnesses, obtaining evidence and inspecting the scene of the ac-
cident." The witnesses may not be required or asked to divulge
what was contained in their testimony before the safety board.
While this protection does not release the witnesses from any duty
to relate factual information needed by the board, it does protect
some confidentially submitted facts and all opinions, suggestions,
recommendations, evaluations, or similar speculations that wit-
nesses submitted to the safety board or that were incorporated into
the safety report."
Since the Air Force regulation governing collateral boards does
not define what factual information should be requested by the
collateral investigation, Air Training Command (ATC) lawyers
have prepared a list of appropriate information. The medical report
of the flight surgeon concerning the pilot's physical condition should
be included, with the results of any alcohol, drug or barbituate
examination before and after the flight and, if appropriate, any
relevant psychiatric evidence." Specifically, ATC suggests a factual
analysis of the degree and nature of injury, length of recovery
period, period of unconsciousness, diseases or physical defects pre-
sent at time of mishap, the name of the person who conducted the
autopsy, as well as x-ray or laboratory results." In addition, the
- AFR 110-14, 5 1(d) (Nov. 1, 1973).
77Id. at5 1.
"
81d. at 5 3(f).
7 9ATCP 110-2, 5 5(a)(5)(b) (May 1974).
81Id., Atch 3, 5 3. Further, in assessing escape/egress problems, ATC rec-
ommends notation of: location in aircraft, method of escape, intent for escape,
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collateral boards should request that sufficient factual data be made
available to determine whether all life support equipment (the ejec-
tion seat, oxygen hoses, etc.) conformed to the military specifica-
tions and functioned as designed. If a defect existed which may
have contributed to the cause of the accident or to the injuries,
special emphasis should be placed on preserving any evidence of
the defect.
CONCLUSION
The human factors investigator has an important responsibility
to discover the nature of injuries, contributing factors, and docu-
mentation of the investigator's observations for both accident pre-
vention purposes and sometimes for use in subsequent administra-
tive or judicial actions. Moreover, for accident prevention purposes,
the safety investigator has a duty to offer opinions, evaluations,
suggestions, and recommendations on the cause of the injury, sus-
pected equipment defects and possible safety improvements. The
safety investigator will work with manufacturers' representatives
and other witnesses on a confidential basis to collect data on which
to base opinions or recommendations. Ordinarily, the opinions of
the safety investigator or the safety board, and the information
secured by assurances of confidentiality should not be incorporated
into the report of the collateral board or otherwise released outside
safety channels. 1 Most of the documentary and factual information,
however, should be made available to the collateral board upon
request. The investigator should understand the narrow basis of the
privilege against disclosing information so that he can protect the
interests of the Air Force safety program, any confidences properly
received from industry or other sources, and the right of the public
or interested citizens to information about military accidents.
exit used, cockpit/cabin condition after impact, order of escape, reasons for es-
cape, communications prior to escape, number of previous ejections, terrain of
parachute landings/crash site, aircraft altitude at time of escape, ejection seat/
parachute training, ejection or bailout information and facts from pilots, egress
difficulties, survival/rescue conditions and/or difficulties. Id. at 5 3(m).
81 AFM 127-2(C3), 5 3-3(9) (Nov. 28, 1975).
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